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IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED ARTICLE on South Africa’s Truth and Rec- onciliation Commission, Rosemary Jolly contests the simplistic and reductionistic formulation of Christianity in postcolonial and
postmodern criticism as merely “superficial pacificism” or “regressive
naïvete” (696). According to Jolly, suspicion of the colonialist legacies of
Christianity has translated into an outright rejection of any mode of
postcolonial resistance inspired by Christian myth, language, or ritual.
The failure to recognize modes of resistance that do not conform to a
secular, rationalist framework has resulted, Jolly suggests, in a too-hasty
foreclosure of the TRC, which drew substantially on a Christian ethic of
forgiveness in a bid to foster national reconciliation in post-apartheid
South Africa. While the focus of this essay is Joy Kogawa’s Obasan and
Itsuka and their contexts of Japanese-Canadian internment and redress,
Jolly’s insight is nevertheless relevant to the argument I make here. For
there is an assumption in much Kogawa criticism that the thematics of
forgiveness and reconciliation that dominate her texts — thematics influ-
enced by an admixture of Christian and Buddhist heritages — undermine
their project of resistance to racial persecution, suffering, and injustice.
This response shortchanges the powerful and complex role that faith plays
in Kogawa’s writing and activism. My reading of Obasan and Itsuka thus
begins by cautioning against an easy denunciation of forgiveness and rec-
onciliation as, say, a reactionary response to colonialism, or as an accept-
ance of in-justice on the part of marginalized peoples.
While forgiveness and reconciliation might be seen as premature and
disempowering responses for women and racial minorities, underestimat-
ing their importance for marginalized groups can also be a way of over-
looking conceptualizations of agency and liberation that fall outside of
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mainstream definitions. Kogawa acknowledges as much in a lecture she
delivered on the topic of reconciliation to the Canadian Caucus On
Human Rights; she qualifies her statement that “Our wholeness comes
from joining and from sharing our brokenness” by acknowledging that
Many feminists would say that the imagery of inadequacy and bro-
kenness are [sic] inappropriate ones for women and do not assist us
to the kind of transforming strength which is now needed. It is true
that doubt and ambivalence can sometimes so immobilize us that in
the end we serve to maintain oppressors in their positions of power.
But healthy doubt is also that which prevents us from succumbing to
the demonic power of an unthinking trust. (“Just Cause” 20)
Here Kogawa resists the perception that projects of reconciliation are nec-
essarily humanist in the worst kind of way by proposing that they may
actually arise out of disparity and difference. As William James Closson
asserts, writing of the interrelation of theology, art, and politics in her nov-
els, Kogawa shows up the failure of mainstream Canadians (those of Eu-
ropean ancestry) to live according to their own ideals. “Her view,” he writes,
“is that minorities can be the healing ‘leaven’ within society, perhaps par-
alleling and legitimating her own prophetic artistry, providing the major-
ity with the means of their own restoration and salvation” (224). In Obasan,
the ethic of forgiveness that lies at the core of the Christian narrative of re-
demption is eminently practiced by Japanese Canadians.
In what follows here I suggest that condemning or dismissing
Kogawa’s narratives of forgiveness and reconciliation overlooks the
transformative potential she locates in these ideals — their capacity to
allow dialogue, communication, and communion between victimizers
and victims. In proposing a departure from the view that forgiveness
and reconciliation are necessarily complicit in modernity’s logic of
universal morality and teleology, I challenge critical evaluations of
Obasan which suggest, as Smaro Kamboureli has, that the novel’s im-
agery of forgiveness “is hardly a political answer to the ravages of the
past” (176) and that Naomi is “a product of the kind of pedagogy that
aspires to reconciliation for the sake of the presumed comfort that
comes with imposing a telos on things” (220). While such criticism of
Obasan as an essentially naïve search for consolation and closure is
understandably concerned to rectify other criticism that strips it of its
resistant force by appropriating it in the service of dominant ideology,
it ignores Kogawa’s alternative approach to forgiveness and reconcili-
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ation, an approach that moves beyond equations of reconciliation with
repression, consolation, or sentimentalization. It is time we interrogated
reductive dualisms that insist on the incompatibility of resistance and
reconciliation.
* * * * *
Although Kogawa’s novels present the possibility of reconciliation and
forgiveness, they nevertheless insist on the importance of conditions: for
instance, repentance and restitution. Indeed, as I discuss in what follows,
Kogawa maintains a strong degree of critical distance from claims of for-
giveness that are extended when neither remorse for wrongdoing has been
expressed nor projects of restitution enacted. To some, her position might
seem to compromise the concept of “authentic forgiveness” that Jacques
Derrida tries ardently to preserve in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness,
in which he proposes that “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable”
(33), and that acts of forgiveness are invalidated the moment they are
fraught with aims or objectives. In a recent interview published in PMLA,
Julia Kristeva responds to Derrida’s position by insisting that forgiveness
offered in the face of no repentance and no promise of change is prob-
lematic at the very least, and may not even qualify as forgiveness in the
first place. “Those who call on an absolute forgiveness without repentance
are in an oblativité” (“Forgiveness” 283), Kristeva maintains, and by this
she means that their generosity, while extraordinary, too easily rescinds
the limits that define social relationships. For this reason, Kristeva rejects
the validity of such public scenes of forgiveness as those witnessed in the
truth commissions of Argentina and South Africa, and instead reserves the
act for the private sphere exclusively and the psychoanalytic scene ideally.
Describing forgiveness as an act of interpretation that does not rationally
reconstruct the crime or offense but rather renarrates the past in the in-
terests of moving beyond the trauma, Kristeva treats forgiveness as exist-
ing outside of community and its principles of jurisdiction and
punishment. There are as many points of agreement as of disagreement
on the subject of forgiveness between Kristeva, the linguist and psycho-
analyst, and Kogawa, the fiction-writer and activist: both recuperate for-
giveness as a potentially transformative and empowering act (in contrast
to those who conflate it with a refusal of power) while nevertheless re-
minding us that the meaning of the act is bound up with the fulfillment
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of conditions. But whereas Kristeva treats forgiveness as private and secu-
lar, Kogawa refuses to conceptually disembed forgiveness from the terrains
of politics and religion. And whereas Kristeva considers forgiveness an act
that more or less benefits the criminal or oppressor, Kogawa considers how
it is that forgiveness can actually empower the victim or survivor. (Indeed,
a significant problem with Kristeva’s view of forgiveness is that it focuses
on the perpetrator to the point of assuming that the analyst can
unproblematically forgive on behalf of the victim). Kogawa’s novels illus-
trate how the determination not to be imprisoned in the category of the
victim can sometimes motivate the pursuit of forgiveness on the part of the
wronged; they furhter suggests that this wish to defuse the power of the op-
pressor constitutes a form of agency that should not be overlooked out of
a dogmatic adherence to principles of judgement and punishment.
Yet Kogawa’s belief in the agency that forgiveness can offer by no
means blinds her to the danger of the language of forgiveness and recon-
ciliation being abused or practiced as a means to an end, such as social
unity or racial harmony. It is important, in this sense, that Naomi re-
sponds with skepticism and uncertainty, for example, to the prayers for
forgiveness of Nakayama-sensei, Obasan, and Uncle. As a way of regis-
tering her feeling that these prayers are unbearable, even odious in their
refusal to acknowledge the crimes committed against her family and com-
munity, Naomi, who is “not thinking of forgiveness,” “stand[s] up and
abruptly leave[s] the room” (263) as they are offered. Of course her po-
sition is by no means unreasonable: in their intimation that Japanese
Canadians are partly answerable for their own mistreatment, these prayers
seem to placidly defer rather than demand racial justice, thereby accept-
ing a process whereby responsibility for racial crimes and their exonera-
tion is transferred onto the shoulders of the victims themselves. This
deferral of racial justice is also witnessed in Nakayama-sensei’s earlier
speech urging co-operation that “sounds half like an apology, as if he were
somehow responsible” (130), in Obasan’s almost incantatory statements
exhorting forgetfulness, and in Uncle’s entreaties to Aunt Emily that
gratitude, not anger or dissatisfaction, be shown for putative Canadian
benevolence and goodwill. In these instances, what poses as forgiveness
might instead be an expression and effect of hegemony, of a situation
whereby the oppressed complicitly disavow the Canadian government’s
responsibility for racial crimes committed and, even more problemati-
cally, erroneously bear that responsibility themselves.
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Yet to attribute these responses to a complicitous attitude alone
would be to account only partially for the readiness and consistency with
which various issei in Obasan make recourse to invocations of mercy and
compassion. The prayers for forgiveness on the part of the older genera-
tion raise the question of what forgiveness means when it is for the
wronged rather than the wrongdoer: whereas the conditions of contrition
and restitution constitute absolutely essential conditions in the latter situ-
ation, in the former, the specific conditions (and indeed whether condi-
tions exist at all) are the prerogative of the oppressed. These prayers also
point, moreover, to the critical exigency of accounting for the role of
cultural difference in paradigms of apology and forgiveness. For apology
and forgiveness play (or at least did play, a generation or two ago) far
more constitutive roles in Japanese culture — the apologizing culture par
excellence — than they do in most others. According to Takeo Doi,
whereas there is often no moral imperative to apologize in Western cul-
tures, apologies usually fulfill an important social regulatory function of
repairing harm and restoring harmony in Japanese culture. And whereas
apologies in Western cultures do not discharge offenders of their obligations
or responsibility, in Japanese culture, they render one unaccountable
through their context of dependency. In other words, because apologies
generally emanate from fear and guilt in Japanese culture, the apologizer’s
dependent status is crucial for the achievement of an efficacious apology.
In the context of Japanese-Canadian immigrant cultures, one could
speculate that the fear and guilt that typically motivate the apology in
Japanese culture become racial fear and guilt — in this sense, the apol-
ogy uttered by, say, Obasan to Mr. Barker emerges out of a nexus of
asymmetrical power relations, in which case the apologetic gesture tem-
porarily provides a sense of alleviation and even agency without actually
transforming the system that produces such power relations. For if the
apology constitutes a proclamation of defenselessness and vulnerability in
the Japanese context, or what Doi calls “a child-like plea to the other
party” (41), in the Canadian context it inadvertently aids in the produc-
tion of white fantasies of Asian dependency and vulnerability.
In other words, performative displays of dependency and vulnerabil-
ity unfortunately operate, in a North American context, to supplement
white fantasies that imagine Asians, and particularly Asian women, as
childlike and submissive. These stereotypes gain further cultural power
when apologizing routinely and almost ritualistically is a reflexive re-
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sponse to racial marginalization and social subordination.4  Thus
Obasan’s apologetic gestures unintentionally collaborate with Japanese
cultural practices of apologizing to reinforce her subordination, a situa-
tion that uncannily resembles the ways that Mr. Barker’s expression of
regret for the violations committed against Japanese Canadians success-
fully reinforces his domination.
If practices of apology and forgiveness are unsatisfactory or suspect
in that they can function, intentionally or not, to reinscribe ideological
messages about the racist operations of power in Canadian society, one
of the problematic messages they can relay is that racism in Canada be-
longs to a putatively discontinuous past. Thus the past tense, the “we
did,” of Mr. Barker’s articulation of remorse cannot initiate genuine for-
giveness because it remembers the internment for the sole purpose of iso-
lating it from a multicultural present, of containing its potential to disrupt
comforting nationalist illusions about the achievement of racial harmony.
But genuine forgiveness is also not enabled by, say, Obasan’s prayerful
utterances or acts of hospitality, for forgiveness itself does not and can-
not constitute a negation or annihilation of the past, an excision from
collective and individual memory of racial pain and suffering. Genuine
forgiveness, according to Kogawa’s pedagogy, must be dissociated from
amnesia of any kind, for it is neither a willful dismissal of an essentially
embarrassing or self-contradictory past nor an involuntary erasure from
memory of events too painful to recall.
Yet if forgiveness entails remembrance, how, Kogawa asks, is forgive-
ness possible when trauma and catastrophe give rise to collective and in-
dividual memory loss? And if forgiveness necessitates revisitation of the
past, is its achievement even worth the psychic agony of recollection? By
having Naomi answer the latter question in the negative, at least initially,
Kogawa accounts for the possibility that forgiveness, to the extent that it
requires remembrance, may not be as affirmative or desirable an attain-
ment as is often thought. Thus a few pages after her reflection on the
excruciating experience of retrieving traumatic memories, described in
intensely visceral language as “memory drain[ing] down the sides of my
face … pull[ing] the growth from the lining of my walls” (214), Naomi
considers that the benefits of mourning, as well as its attendant possibili-
ties in the form of closure and healing, may be overrated given that no
amount of remembering can provide an adequate or equivalent return to
the past: “I can cry for the flames that have cracked in the dryness and cry
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for people who no longer sing. I can cry for Obasan who has turned to
stone. But what then? Uncle does not rise up and return to his boats.
Dead bones do not take on flesh” (219). Naomi’s sense of the potential
futility of engaging the tasks of remembrance and forgiveness — her
awareness that they can provide neither adequate restitution nor complete
reconciliation since they cannot return the most victimized victims, vic-
tims on whose behalf it may seem presumptuous, if not irrelevant, to
forgive — calls into question the common equation of remembering and
revealing with healing. Obasan thus registers, through the musings of
Naomi, a heightened degree of self-consciousness about its own narrative
project of recollecting history, for Kogawa is intensely aware of the reasons
for a cultural and historical preference of forgetfulness to forgiveness. For-
getfulness, as Naomi speculates, provides a sought-after avoidance of affect,
a welcome relief from the oppressiveness and grief of racial memory:
Some memories, too, might be better forgotten. Didn’t Obasan once
say, “It is better to forget”? What purpose is served by hauling forth
the jar of inedible food? If it is not seen, it does not horrify. What is
past recall is past pain. Questions from all these papers, questions
referring to turbulence in the past, are an unnecessary upheaval in the
delicate ecology of this numb day. (48)
To the extent, then, that Naomi articulates the objection that racial pa-
ralysis may be preferable to racial pain, and that remembrance may actu-
ally further injure racially injured subjects, Kogawa thinks arguments in
favour of forgetfulness sufficiently substantial and compelling to deserve
consideration.
Yet Kogawa’s narrative eventually works against the logic of amne-
sia insofar as it favours recollecting the past to the alternative of having
it dismissed, denied, or discounted in dominant versions of history.
Through the experience of Naomi, Obasan bears out Kogawa’s claim,
asserted in interviews and critical writings, that “we must not ever forget
lest we repeat the evils of our ancestors.… To embrace that and to de-
mand of ourselves a refusal to repeat that history is a great calling” (“In-
terview with Jeanne Delbaere” 465). So while Kogawa seems to
sympathize with the inclination to remember the past with the aim of
eventually escaping it — with Naomi’s recourse to remembrance as a way
“to get away from all this … from the memories, from the deaths, from
the heap of words” (201) — she nevertheless discourages an approach to
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remembrance that recollects only in order to forget. But Kogawa’s nar-
rative defense of recollecting as opposed to effacing the past is not made
without rigorous interrogation of the meanings and purposes of remem-
brance, and of the possibilities and problems of accessing memory as a
coping strategy for dealing with the present. Kogawa’s thoughtful reflec-
tions on the import and uses of memory have been peculiarly overlooked
in the overwhelming majority of literary criticism on Obasan,5  much of
which has interpreted Obasan as “getting over” Canada’s racist past in
order to “get on” with a present in which racism is still going strong —
as extending a form of forgiveness by proxy to an ostensibly redeemed
Canadian nation — but to imply that the novel’s exhortation of remem-
brance enables a form of forgetting is to miss its critical point, articulated
by Naomi, that “the present is shaped by the past” (25).
As much as Obasan ultimately privileges the relation between for-
giveness and memory, it nevertheless demonstrates a considerable aware-
ness of the impartiality and mutability of the latter. Naomi’s reflection
that “the present is shaped by the past” is located in a passage that con-
stitutes a larger meditation on the ontological nature of memory and on
its potential to render epistemological claims about the certainty of truth
suspect: “All our ordinary stories are changed in time,” she thinks, “altered
as much by the present as the present is shaped by the past” (25). Her
observation asks us to consider what it means for the possibilities of for-
giveness and reconciliation when competing versions of history vie for
authority. In other words, if forgiveness requires a relation to the past, if
reconciliation requires remembrance, are the former viable or realizable
aims given that, as Naomi knows, narrative memory can be inaccessible,
uncertain, and subjective? The question is all the more vexed because
Kogawa’s novels and critical writings share Paul Ricoeur’s view that “For-
giveness is a sort of healing of memory” (The Just 144) even as they dem-
onstrate a profound awareness that memory itself can be unstable,
indeterminate, and unreliable. Indeed, the tension in Kogawa’s work
between a humanist perspective and a more postmodern one — between
an awareness of the importance of such currently devalued conceptual
entities as truth, history, and memory, on the one hand, and an under-
standing that these entities are not always as reliable and responsible as we
might like, on the other — has created a sharp divide in literary criticism
on the novel, with critics such as Rachelle Kanefsky and Minh T. Nguyen
strongly contesting Donald Goellnicht’s claim that Obasan demonstrates
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“that history is not fixed, but discursive, a ‘form of saying’ founded in
language, which is always in a state of flux” (294). Yet Kogawa’s sug-
gestion, conveyed through the medium of Naomi, that truth can be
“more murky, shadowy, and grey” (33) than Aunt Emily’s intensely lit-
eralist approach allows does not, it seems to me, contradict or negate her
humanist aspirations to develop what Ricoeur calls a “culture of just
memory” (“Memory” 11). Indeed, were Kogawa to adopt a purely
immanentist perspective, were she to suggest in radically postmodern
fashion that past events remain trapped in their pastness, then it would
seem that the only position that would be available to her would be one
that insisted on forgetfulness. Yet she rejects this position and adopts the
view — similarly adopted and elaborated by Ricoeur in Time and Nar-
rative — that the past is available only through memory, and that while
this does not eliminate the ontological inviolability and irretrievability of
pastness, it does mean that the original past is open to modification and
revision. Forgiveness and reconciliation, from this perspective, do not
undo the past but strive to renarrate it. They are not a forgetting of events
themselves, but a different way of signifying, a way of signifying that “gives
memory a future” (Ricoeur, Figuring 13).
And Kogawa affirms the view, articulated in different ways by
Ricoeur as well as Kristeva, that forgiveness constitutes a form of
renarration that recollects the past while simultaneously opening up pos-
sibilities for a future. One of the reasons the novel ultimately disappoints
the possibility of forgiveness is that the Canadian government seeks to
rationally reconstruct events in such a way that thwarts the possibility of
rational reconstruction. Thus the document placed at the end of Obasan,
a memorandum produced by the Co-operative Committee on Japanese
Canadians for the Canadian House of Commons and Senate, forestalls
the movement toward resolution not only through its failure to index the
voices of the oppressed but also through its discourse of dogmatic ration-
ality and univocal meaning; it displays, in Kristevan terms, the character-
istics of “signification” that suggest the impossibility of forgiveness. In its
negation of the affective and political aspects of internment survival, the
document uncannily resonates with the “carnivorous” speech uttered by
the spectre-like figure of the Grand Inquistor, a distant and disembod-
ied speech that signals both “a judgment and a refusal to hear” (250), an
indifference to real human suffering. The production of this mode of
speech would certainly constitute a vain labour and an ineffectual exer-
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cise to Naomi, for whom Emily’s collection of data and official records
constitutes white noise or meaningless speech that does not capture or
resonate with the actual ordeal endured by her family and community:
“All of Aunt Emily’s words, all her papers, the telegrams and petitions are
like scratchings in the barnyard,” she reflects, “the evidence of much ac-
tivity, scaly claws hard at work. But what good they do I do not know.
… They do not touch us where we are planted here in Alberta” (208). At
the source of Naomi’s distrust of official records and documents is her
conviction that they exclude the felt specificities of survivors’ own expe-
riences of internment and its aftermath.
Naomi’s distrust suggests that even as she ultimately affirms the
potential value of epistemic “truth” and “reality,” she also has deep mis-
givings about the “objectivity” of apparently factual information that
through its “cool print” (208) or sanitizing language undermines the full
affective range (including bewilderment, anger, abjection, frustration,
etc.) of Japanese Canadians’ responses to internment. Her insights into
the complex workings of language complicate a somewhat simplistic and
exaggeratedly polarized critical debate on Obasan’s putative postmodernism
or supposed humanism. If Naomi ultimately disavows the potential dis-
illusionment, or even nihilism, of a radically postmodern position and
avers Emily’s humanist credo that “It matters to get facts straight,” and
that “Reconciliation can’t begin without mutual recognition of the facts”
(201), she nonetheless retains an indispensable suspicion of the relevance
of factual discourse for reconciliation on the basis of its potential insuf-
ficiency or even ineffectualness when not supplemented by other forms
of discourse. Because they register a failure to listen and a shortage of
social feeling, official documents alone do not and cannot efficaciously
mediate the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation processes that,
Kogawa suggests, must follow genuine attendance to the repressed and
marginalized voices of those who were (and may still be) wronged.
But while the inefficacy of rational reconstructive language would
seem to unite Kogawa and Kristeva on the subject of forgiveness, there is
a crucial difference in their views: whereas the former seems to adopt an
Arendtian view that forgiveness and reconciliation are temporal and his-
torical, the latter insists on their atemporality and ahistoricity. Kristeva
strategically holds onto her assertion in Black Sun that forgiveness exists
outside of the time of scansion, that “pardon is ahistorical. It breaks the
concatenation of causes and effects, crimes and punishment, it stays the
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time of action” (200), in order to argue that forgiveness cannot force its
way into the public realm. As she explains in an interview, “I insist on this
phenomenon of the atemporality of forgiveness because it helps us under-
stand why forgiveness cannot inscribe itself in the social arena” (“Forgive-
ness” 285). For all the similarities between Kristeva’s and Kogawa’s views
on forgiveness, where their positions clearly part ways, then, is in the
question of temporality: for Kogawa, forgiveness is strongly rooted in the
temporal, and is precisely what ensures the continuity of time. Whereas
Kristeva’s insistence that forgiveness is atemporal derives from her position
that it belongs to the private realm alone, and ideally to the psychoanalytic
scene, Kogawa’s suggestion that it is temporal obtains from her view that
“The private and the public, the personal and the political, the internal and
the external are all co-extensive” (“Just Cause” 20).
Kogawa’s notion that forgiveness is very much a temporal concept
applicable to collective contexts is witnessed, to varying extents, in Obasan
and Itsuka. Specifically, these texts configure the temporal constitution
of forgiveness, as well as reconciliation and redress, as the future anterior.
By this I mean that they suggest that the teleology of such phenomenon
“is not unlike determinism, but it is dispersed rather than operationalized
through linear causality. The future inhabits the present, yet it has not yet
come” (Fortun 196). From this perspective, how the past is recollected
in the present affects the future, for events that occur in the present
achieve their significance from what will occur henceforth. While the
future can be folded back in detrimental ways, as when the past merely
replicates the future, reconciliation and redress, Kogawa suggests,
anteriorize it positively by redirecting it toward new possibilities; they
thus render interpretation incomplete and responsibility infinite, always
ahead of themselves, aware of how the present generates the future.
Kogawa posits reconciliation and redress, then, in terms that account for
the temporal boundedness of past and present, envisioning them as
resignifying the former in ways that enable positive intervention into tra-
jectories already in motion.
Obasan, for example, works against Naomi’s relentless speculations
that redress is temporally out of joint, unhinged from time altogether. It
counters her logic that to seek redress is to unnecessarily excavate a past
that “belongs to yesterday” when “there are so many other things to at-
tend today” and ultimately avers Emily’s axiomatic statement — made in
response to Naomi’s conjecture that because the “past is so long,” perhaps
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“we should turn the page and move on” — that “the past is the future”
(45). In other words, the text confirms the latter’s perspective that redress
pulls the past into significance for the sake of rerouting the future. Un-
cle’s almost incantatory enunciations of “itsuka,” a word that translates
as “someday,” is highly relevant in this sense. The term, which is consist-
ently invoked in the context of the possibility of recuperation or recon-
ciliation, is clearly structured on a logic of deferral—“someday” in-
definitely suspends the future even as it looks steadfastly toward it. To the
extent that the term is only partially present, dependent on a dialectical
tension between present and future, it speaks directly to Kogawa’s dedi-
cation to conceptualizing reconciliation and redress as anticipating new
possibilities that have not yet come.
Kogawa’s commitment to exploring the possibilities of redress for
enacting a liberatory future lays the narrative groundwork of Itsuka. The
title itself cues us to this commitment, as well as directing us toward her
notion that reconciliation and redress are never definitively achieved but
always not quite or in process. Yet criticism on the text has overlooked the
openness and incompleteness of Itsuka’s representation of the so-called
“achievement” of redress by ineluctably interpreting its final scene as ful-
filling rather than deferring reconciliation and resolution.5  Redress in
Itsuka does not, however, represent a precipitate rush toward the telos of
racial harmony but a symbolic starting point for the not-yet-realizable yet
nevertheless worthwhile project of striving toward reconciliation. Indeed,
in this text, more so even than in Obasan, we encounter Kogawa’s view
that redress exceeds the present by encompassing both the past and future.
It is because the text is keyed to the anteriorization of the future that
Naomi narrates in detail her experience of Obasan’s physical and men-
tal decline and gradual death; for while this sequence of events might
seem anomalous in a book that is otherwise preoccupied with describing
the former’s involvement in the redress movement, it suggests that the
movement itself emerges out of an awareness that the future has a prov-
enance. It is significant, in this sense, that Uncle repeats “itsuka” again
and again in Obasan and that the title character of the former novel al-
most ritualistically invokes the same refrain in Itsuka; for in many ways
what we might call the travail of redress functions as a tribute to those
who suffered the internment without ever experiencing an official apol-
ogy or acknowledgement of the wrongs committed against them. The
spectres of Obasan and Uncle emerge, then, as “the dead [who] stand with
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their feet in doorways, asking not to be forgotten” (149), as the “politi-
cal unconscious” or the absent presences of Itsuka specifically and the
redress struggle generally. They rest beneath the surface of Kogawa’s
prose, haunting it as ghosts that render thinkable the principle of respon-
sibility that inheres in redress.
What the text’s working and reworking of time further suggests is
that the issei conceive of temporality in radically different terms than do
Anglo-Saxon Canadians. For as Naomi notes, whereas the former under-
stand the present as modified by cuts and projections, the latter generally
perceive it in a rigid, narrow, and overdetermined manner. Observing, for
example, Pastor Jim’s profound incapacity to communicate with (and
thus convert) the issei, she reflects that
The difficulty Pastor Jim has with the issei has something to do with
time. For Pastor Jim, the moment is “now.” “Now,” he says, “is the
hour of decision.” The past with its sorrows is to be redeemed in the
present. Truth is spontaneous. We are to stand straight, look forth-
rightly in each other’s eyes, and the more transparent our feelings, the
more we’re to be trusted. But the issei! To them such demonstrations
are aggressive, arrogant and, at the least, extremely rude. Pastor Jim,
I suppose, must think they are mentally retarded or emotionally dead.
I know, however, that they are acutely sensitive and that their feelings
are all the more intense for being contained. (31)
Where Pastor Jim possesses an absolutist view of the now, one that can-
not account for the possibilities of ghosts, inheritance, and generations,
the issei have retained a Japanese perception of time that accounts for the
temporal excess of the present, for its inclusion of those who are not yet
and no longer.6  But the latter’s recognition that the present exceeds itself
also emerges out of their experience of oppression as outsiders in Cana-
dian society. Not unlike other ethnicized groups that have immigrated to
North America, the issei, Kogawa suggests, view their racial suffering and
hardship in the present as palliating or even eliminating suffering and
hardship for future generations. In other words, as victims of racist and
nationalist violence, the issei endow the future with the justice that the
present lacks. Naomi recalls Nakayama-sensei explaining that, “issei im-
migrants were people of sacrifice. They came to the new land only to
perish in the culture clash. ‘Itsuka,’ he’d say, ‘your sacrifice will someday
be known. … They endured for a future that only the children will know.
Their endurance is an act of faith and love’” (241). If the movement for
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redress views the present as a “sacrifice,” a responsibility, or better yet, a gift
to the future that is proffered out of a faith in its possibility, then this view,
as we see here, follows forth from a concept of time that marginalized
groups such as the issei have generally tended to construct.
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the redress move-
ment draws strictly and rigidly from Japanese constructions of temporal-
ity. For while Japanese Canadians (particularly issei but also nisei) have
a strong sense of the anteriority of the future, Kogawa suggests that they
often have disjunct views on what the future looks like and how it ought
to be achieved. Without wanting to essentialize Itsuka as a necessarily
accurate or authentic representation of the redress movement, then, I
would suggest that it does point up some of the contradictions and dif-
ferences between the conceptual frame of temporality suggested by redress
and the concept of time ascribed to by many issei. For if the ideology of
redress purports that a liberatory future in the material world can be made
possible through political struggle, to many issei such struggle simply
cannot be afforded and justice in the future must merely be awaited.
These potentially incompatible configurations of the future structure in
Itsuka can be seen in the split that runs through the motif of “itsuka” or
“someday”: for while the text itself seems to offer and draw energy from
the possibility that “someday” represents a just future that can be made
possible (or at least more possible) through political agitation, when the
word itself is invoked by Obasan and Uncle, for example, it is alternately
as an acquiescent expectation of return to pre-internment conditions, an
admission of capitulation to forces that one can presumably not control,
and an appeal to eternal transcendence. In other words, while “someday”
represents an attempt to make realizable what is unreal in the context of
redress, it also represents, as Naomi speculates it does for Obasan, an at-
tempt to “make realizable what is real” (Obasan 49). For issei such as
Obasan, whose familiarity with the intensely repressive and racist policies
of the Canadian nation-state has convinced her of the impossibility of
productive resistance, recourse to the promise of a transcendent future
seems to provide some form of consolation in the face of overwhelming
oppression and suffering. To this extent, issei cultural perceptions of tem-
porality as future-oriented problematically facilitate, validate, and rein-
force the agenda of the dominant culture.
By drawing attention to the particular ways that Japanese notions of
mutual and partial responsibility for conflict and conflict resolution play
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out in the context of redress,7  Kogawa reveals that even as these notions
open up the possibility of political struggle, they nevertheless operate to
produce internal resistance to it. For if issei like Obasan are deeply sus-
picious of the movement, preferring instead to co-operate with the po-
litical process rather than work in opposition to it, that has not only to
do with their concept of time, but also with their preservation of such cul-
tural values as compromise and negotiation. While these values might be
said to have enabled redress in a part of the world where institutions and
bureaucracies have, until very recently, been viewed as incapable of regret,
remorse, or affect generally (Tavuchis 43), for many issei, these values
overlap with and reinforce the concepts of tolerance and harmony that the
myth of multiculturalism has put into cultural circulation. Naomi, for her
part, registers the convergences between the Japanese concept of
“wagamama” — a term that translates as “selfish individualism” — and
Canadian multicultural illusions when she imagines that “Obasan would
probably say that redress was wagamama. After all and after all, Canada
was a wonderful country” (147). The problematic interplay between cul-
tural values of co-operation and harmony, racial affect such as fear and
shame, and nationalist discourses of multicultural diversity and tolerance,
becomes more and more evident as Naomi’s account of the redress strug-
gle becomes more detailed, more focused on the internal rivalries that
constituted that struggle.
Indeed, much of the latter part of Itsuka constitutes a sustained cri-
tique of that elite fraction of the redress movement that worked in oppo-
sition to the National Association of Japanese Canadians (NAJC) by
exploiting issei values of co-operation and harmony, using them to elicit
feelings of racial abjection and guilt for the sake of mobilizing support for
a profoundly inadequate compensation package. The dark twists through
which this more politically legitimized group manipulated the issei em-
phasis on harmony into a tool for the production of complicity are ob-
served by Naomi: “Some of the strongest, the most political conscious,
are bowed down by a sense of shame. Their deepest belief in harmony has
been completely distorted” (241). Certainly drawing on disempowered
people’s cultural beliefs in social harmony to generate self-guilt and shame
constitutes a pernicious rhetorical strategy, particularly when that strat-
egy is actually intended to shut down potential sites and modes of ena-
bling some sense of such harmony. But this rhetorical strategy becomes
more pernicious still when it establishes an uncritical equivalence between
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Japanese and Canadian values of harmony, tolerance, and the pursuit of
collective good in order to establish a false contradiction between these
values and the project of redress. Such a strategy is at work, for example,
when Nikki maintains that “people [i.e., Japanese Canadians] want to be
cooperative” and “want forgiveness,” that “the idea of individual compen-
sation is the real sell-out” not only for this reason, but also because
“‘Canada has always put the group ahead of the individual. We’re not
Americans” (217). In this problematic formulation, the selfish and
ungenerous motivations behind the Canadian government’s refusal to
provide individual compensation are transmuted into the selfishness and
ungenerousness of those Japanese Canadians seeking compensation;
moreover, the latter are represented as opposing, betraying, and possibly
even threatening, once again, the “altruistic” and “benevolent” Canadian
nation. We encounter more of this hegemonic logic in Dr. Stinson’s
claim that “your [the Japanese-Canadian] community doesn’t need any
money. If you were sincerely interested in justice, you’d concern your-
selves with the genuinely disadvantaged” (221). Through recourse to the
model minority myth, this logic seeks to displace the responsibility for
Japanese Canadians’ success or failure within the Canadian nation
squarely on their own shoulders. It does so by reasoning, very speciously,
that it is those Japanese Canadians seeking redress, and not the Canadian
government that interned and dispersed them, who idealize an individu-
alist ideology. This reasoning erases the political and elides the material
history of the internment by drawing on “an ideology of depoliticized
self-healing” (Palumbo-Liu 396) that deflects attention away from seri-
ous social critique. So while invocation of the model minority myth may
produce persuasive arguments against compensation — as Naomi admits
Dr. Stinson’s position “is hard to dispute. Japanese Canadians are not
needy. We’re middle-class, law-abiding citizens. A model minority” (177)
— in truth they rely on a model of assimilation that suggests that the
traumatized and marginalized are themselves responsible for their own
psychological and material adjustment.
Naomi’s admission indicates, on its own, the troubling power that
hegemonic discourse has to inaugurate (racially and other) marginalized
subjects who disavow their marginalization. Her initial response to the
redress effort — her claim that it “is rather inconsequential if you con-
sider what’s going on in the world” (102) — is a testament of sorts to the
efficaciousness of anti-redress and anti-resistance rhetoric. Yet the narra-
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tive trajectory of Itsuka traces, in a mere fifty pages, Naomi’s movement
from profound suspicion and distrust of redress to an affirmation of it:
if she discloses to readers that “I’m not a true believer in redress. I’m not
a true believer in anything much” (154), she soon recants this statement,
asserting that “We all know we are a people who were wronged. It’s time
to stand up. It’s time” (203). In the context of the refusal of the Cana-
dian and other so-called democratic governments to acknowledge respon-
sibility for the commission of atrocious acts, Naomi realizes that the
redress struggle, to the extent that it might demystify the myth of
multiculturalism by refuting the putative truths that official discourse
seeks to “pass off” as facts, could enable a liberatory future. She throws
support behind Aunt Emily’s position that “The lie is alive in the world.
It was there in Nazi Germany. It’s in South Africa. In Latin America. In
every country in the world. This is why redress matters. Because there are
many people intent on defending the oppressor’s rights no matter what
the truth, and they are in places of power” (222). How are we meant to
reconcile this new affirmation of truth with Naomi’s earlier insistence, in
this novel as well as Obasan, that truth is intensely fragmented, subjective,
and self-referential? After all, even in Kogawa’s critical writings on recon-
ciliation, there is an intense awareness and open acknowledgement that
subjects and collectivities alike are, to borrow her own terminology, “bro-
ken” and “inadequate.” And even Aunt Emily, arguably a humanist par
excellence, concedes that “There are as many stories [of redress] as there
are individuals” (239). While the most obvious response would be that
for Aunt Emily, as perhaps for Kogawa, there are several versions of es-
sentially singular (if extraordinarily impenetrable) truth, I would also
suggest that it is the case that Kogawa affirms redress because, in the
manner theorized by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, it constitutes a
“real revolutionary practice” to the extent that it “takes control of the
production of truth” (151). To this extent, to quote that earlier passage
from Itsuka again, redress is about taking over the production of truth
from those “intent on defending the oppressor’s rights no matter what the
truth” who “are in places of power” (222).
It is precisely because the official apology for the internment and its
aftermath includes an acknowledgment of wrongdoing — and hence a
corrective to the falsehoods produced by the dominant culture — that
Naomi’s reaction to the achievement of redress is almost fulsomely eu-
phoric. The moment of apology is described in a language of overflow.
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The apology itself clearly moves her. Its transformative capacity is regis-
tered in her description of it as “the magic of speech” and a “ritual thing
that humans do, the washing of stains through the speaking of words”
(274). It is perhaps particularly registered in her fascinating suggestion
that through its locution, she returns to an originary or pre-symbolic state:
“I laugh. I am whole. I am as complete as when I was a very young child”
(276). But while the apology might seem to contain a mystificatory
power, its power, I suggest, actually lies in its potential to demystify. In
other words, if apologies are “illocutionary acts” — acts that, according
to J.L. Austin, in saying do what they say, when they say — what apolo-
gies do (at least what efficacious apologies do) is reveal a formerly re-
pressed truth. After all, it is the apology that acknowledges a formerly
unacknowledged version of events that is felicitous; apologies that do not
include a full confession insult those who receive them, if they have an
affective impact at all. Apologies are, as we see in Itsuka, acts of revelation.
That is why Naomi calls them “magic” and why the sociologist Nicholas
Tavuchis says that they are “transformative” (5). They transform because
they take hold, in a positive or liberating way, of the production of truth.
But while the apology provided by redress enables a certain degree
of control over the production of truth, we might find ourselves asking
just how much control it allows. After all, in the case of the Japanese-
Canadian internment, a single subject — the then Canadian prime
minister, Brian Mulroney — uttered the apology. Was it him, the state,
or Japanese Canadians who took control of the production of truth on
22 September 1988? Without supplying any ready answers to such a
question, Roy Miki, in writing about that day of so-called “victory,”
and specifically about the politics of the Canadian prime minister’s
apologetic speech to Japanese Canadians, registers the readiness with
which an anti-racist struggle was recuperated and contained by racist
discourse. Noting the implications of the ways that the scene of apol-
ogy was spatially configured — the Prime Minister became the star
actor on a national stage, while Japanese Canadians were consigned to
the role of spectators and guests in the parliamentary gallery — Miki
notes the expedience with which an occasion that should have been
about recognition of racial difference was converted into an event for
promoting the nationalist multicultural ideology of harmony and unity.
With one exception — the reading of an excerpt from Obasan by Ed
Broadbent, the New Democratic party leader at the time — Japanese
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Canadian voices were, Miki claims, strikingly silent (or rather silenced)
during that moment:
“‘Japanese Canadians’” were re-presented through the handful of
subjects in the guest gallery above the politicians, but the official discourse
was managed by the translation of “Canadian of Japanese ancestry” from
surviving “victim” to exemplary “citizen.” In this moment of closure, the
narrative of JCs was rewritten by the larger political system as a national
story of resolution” (Broken  197).
While Miki calls into question the degree of control that redress
provided Japanese Canadians over the production of truth, Naomi’s ac-
count, rendered as it is in understandably excited discourse, is disappoint-
ingly uncritical of the imbrication of redress in institutional structures of
power. Her reaction seems to idealize that power as sovereign, or at the
very least, to idealize the speech act associated with it as sovereign. In this
sense, Naomi’s response to the prime-ministerial apology constitutes, I
think, the overdetermination of the scene of utterance that Judith But-
ler painstakingly theorizes in Excitable Speech. Fantasizing or figuring
power vis-à-vis a culpable subject (even when that subject stands in for
the state) who is imagined as speaking with the forceful voice of that
power exhibits, according to Butler, “a wish to return to a simpler and
more reassuring map of power, one in which the assumption of sover-
eignty remains secure” (78). In other words, establishing language as the
site of politics resurrects an old political terrain in which power was a
sovereign formation at a time when globalization, as Hardt and Negri
point out and Butler confirms, is dispersing and deterritorializing power.
Butler’s meditations, while they concern hate speech, enable many
insights apropos of public apologies. Specifically, her warning about re-
ducing elaborate institutional structures to the actions of the subject cau-
tions us against interpreting redress as Naomi seems to: that is, as an act
that entirely restores agency to disempowered subjects.
Rather than interpret redress as unequivocally empowering, I would
suggest we realize that it can comply with and facilitate nationalist dis-
course. While this might not be problematic on its own, it becomes prob-
lematic when redress enables the perpetuation of multiculturalist myths
based on illusions of racial justice. Perhaps, however, we might read the
official document that closes Itsuka in the same way that we read the offi-
cial document that closes Obasan — that is, as a text that does not affirm
the ideology of multiculturalism tout court, but that in some important ways
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resists it. In Itsuka, this document contains a section that reads: “Canadi-
ans commit themselves to the creation of a society that ensures equality and
justice for all regardless of race and ethnic origin.” It also contains an arti-
cle that claims that on behalf of Canadians, the Canadian government
“recognize[s], with great respect, the fortitude and determination of Japa-
nese Canadians who, despite great stress and hardship, retain their commit-
ment and loyalty to Canada and contribute so richly to the development
of the Canadian nation” (n. pag.). Considering Itsuka’s narrativization of
the Canadian government’s repeated and protracted attempts to circumvent
the issue of redress, how else can we read the placement of this document
at the end of the text except ironically? And what should we make of the
explicit reference to Japanese-Canadian “loyalty and commitment” to the
Canadian nation? Might it suggest that as a so-called “model minority,”
Japanese Canadians are more “worthy” of an apology and reparations than
other groups (e.g. Native Canadians or Holocaust survivors), that practices
of “good citizenship” reap “rewards”? I formulate these questions not to
discount the importance of the redress struggle and achievement, but to
suggest that uncritically praising them as unequivocally emancipatory may
encourage the perpetuation of multiculturalist “lies” that the redress move-
ment and Itsuka set out to perforate.
Neither the redress struggle nor the text of Itsuka constitutes the
redress achievement as actually “achieved.” Kogawa’s novel, in particu-
lar, recognizes that the structures of institutionalized racism in Canada
(and elsewhere) are far too complexly interwoven into the fabric of peo-
ple’s daily lives to be eliminated or diffused in a single moment in time.
Even if it refers to the national apology, as well as redress generally, as “a
promise fulfilled, a vision realized” (275), Itsuka nevertheless suggests that
these attainments, however significant, remain unfulfilled, unrealized.
Indeed, despite the language of plenitude, completion, and closure that
characterizes the text’s final pages, Kogawa ultimately suggests that redress
does not close the past and the present but rather opens up the future. It
is to an anti-transcendent horizon of justice and hope that the title of
Itsuka most refers, I think, a horizon towards which Miki gestures when
he writes that “For a collective struggle supplemented by the impossibility
of full ethical engagement … the future is always around the corner; there
is no victory, but only victories that are also warnings” (199). While
Naomi conceives the redress “victory” less as a warning and more as a
beacon of sorts — referring to the official apology as “a distant sun, an
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asterisk to guide us through the nights that yet must come” (274) — she
does imagine it in the same open-ended terms that Miki does. Insofar as
it “exposes the vacillating boundaries of speech” by revealing the limits
of sovereignty while nonetheless pointing toward a “new form of speak-
ing” that opens up rather than forecloses “new kinds of worlds,” the of-
ficial apology to Japanese Canadians represents what Butler refers to as
“the kind of speaking that takes place on the border of the unsayable” (41)
but what Kogawa simply calls “someday.” From what Itsuka ultimately
suggests, the achievement of redress does not represent “someday,” but it
could help to draw it, in the form of forgiveness and reconciliation, fur-
ther into the realm of the possible. Kogawa confirms this much in an
interview in which she was asked how the concept of forgiveness in Itsuka
can be instituted in the political realm. She responded thus: “What is
healing for a community is more than just a solution of a political kind.
What heals is a process of empowerment” (“Literary”  15). Someday may
then be a series of moments, moments that reinvigorate time itself by
bringing into view the possibility of a future that enables new forms of
utterances, other kinds of relationships.
NOTES
1 According to the sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis, oppressed individuals and
collectivities apologize “promiscuously and excessively” and as a “defensive and propitiatory
reaction” (40) to an unrecognized and unstable subjectivity.
2 See Amoko and Beauregard for recent discussions of the multiculturalist ideology un-
derlying Kogawa criticism.
3 While Itsuka has been relatively ignored by critics, when it has been examined its
narrative reconstruction of the Redress Settlement has been inevitably interpreted as provid-
ing closure and resolution. Rachelle Kanefsky, for instance, argues that the text “fulfil[s] the
dream that ‘itsuka,’ someday the better day will come,” and maintains that readers witness
how the “struggle for historical legitimacy is finally won” (28), while Elizabeth Kella main-
tains that “the coda of Itsuka functions as a mark of closure, integration, and resolution”
(208) by “imaginatively and optimistically resolv[ing] what might be called a crisis” (189).
On the grounds that the text represents redress as concluding struggle rather than enabling
it, Davina Te-Min Chen borrows from the liberation theory of Gustavo Gutierrez in order
to argue that it reveals “how hegemonic forces may define even the modes of resistance to
oppression and thus preclude the authentic liberation of ‘continuous creation, never ending’”
(100).
4 For recent sociological and anthropological studies of Japanese constructions of tem-
porality, see Ben-Ari and Larson.
5 In her historical account of the role of Japanese cultural values and conventions in
the struggle for redress, Maryka Omatsu explains that “Traditionally Japanese hold everyone
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involved in a conflict partly responsible for it. There is a common saying that even a thief is
thirty per cent right. To this day, it is through mutual apology and compromise that the
Japanese strive to avoid the public notoriety of a law suit” (111).
6 The extent to which apologies are potentially transformative or viewed as such is also
a matter of culture. The legal scholar Eric Yamamoto considers the role of culture in his dis-
cussion of conflict and resolution in American racial conflict. He notes, for example, that
whereas in Western legal culture a genuine apology is viewed as “an admission of liability”
rather than “a legitimate legal remedy” or “a component of justice” (193-94), in the Japa-
nese legal system, compensation is perceived as less important than reparation and an apol-
ogy for wrongdoing plays a central role in repairing group harmony.
7 Yamamoto raises this possibility in his interrogation of whether or not redress is in-
deed a radical project. Asking if Japanese-American redress was only about reparations for a
minority viewed as cooperative and consequently deserving, he speculates on whether redress
means the redistribution of wealth, power, and justice for all or if it only concerns those
minorities who fit into the “patriot/supermodel minority.” Without providing any definitive
conclusions, he seems to suggest that redress is more about an alleviation of white guilt than
a radical reorganization of structures of power that privilege whiteness.
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